James Sanchez v. Little America Hotel Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
James Sanchez v. Little America Hotel Corporation
: Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dale F. Gardiner, Robert J. Debry; Attorney for Appellant.
Lee Henning; Christensen, Jensen and Powell; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sanchez v. Little America Hotel, No. 880316.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2279




DOCKET NO. Q ^03|(p 




LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, MARTIN STERN, 
JR. AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOC, 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
POOLS, INC., a Utah corpor-
ation, HIGHAM-HILTON 
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, 
INC, a Utah corporation 
and JOHN DOES I THROUGH 
III, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
DALE F. GARDINER 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Robert J. DeBry and Associates 
Attorney for Appellant 
4001 South 700 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Lee Henning 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Respondent Higham-Hilton Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
MAR2 0198S 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No: 880316 
i q b 
CterK Supreme Court, Utah 




LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, MARTIN STERN, 
JR. AIA ARCHITECT & ASSOC, 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
POOLS, INC., a Utah corpor-
ation, HIGHAM-HILTON 
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, 
INC, a Utah corporation 
and JOHN DOES I THROUGH 
III, 
Defendant-Respondents. 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE 
DALE F. GARDINER 
ROBERT J. DEBRY 
Robert J. DeBry and Associates 
Attorney for Appellant 
4001 South 700 East, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Lee Henning 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Respondent Higham-Hilton Mechanical 
Contractors, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, #510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No: 880316 
Jeffrey Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Respondent Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architects & 
Associates 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Donald J. Purser 
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BARRETT, P.C. 
Attorneys for Respondent Okland Construction Co. 
39 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Theodore Kanell 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorneys for Respondent Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Paul Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Cross-Claimant/Appellant Little America 
Hotel Corp. 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ii 
Robert J. DeBry and Associates, Attorneys for 




PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
The parties to this proceeding are: 
James Sanchez Plaintiff/Appellant 
Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architects Defendant/Respondent 
and Associates 
Okland Construction Defendant/Respondent 
Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. Defendant/Respondent 
Higham Hilton Mechanical Defendant/Respondent 
Contractors Inc., 
Little America Hotel Corp., a defendant in the lower court 
proceedings is not a party in this proceeding but is the 
appellant in a related appeal. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND DESCRIPTION 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 
(3)(j) and Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, a statute of 
repose which bars actions against contractors, planners and 
designers, after seven years, violates Article I Section 11, 
the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
2. Whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 violates equal 
protection of the laws as guaranteed by Article I Sections 2 & 
24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14 th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 
3. Whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 applies to a 
mechanical subcontractor who merely supplies a defective sauna 
heating unit to be plugged in. 
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4. Whether Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 can be applied to 
an out of state architect when there is no factual record to 
determine whether the architect was present in Utah after it 
designed the pool. 
5. Whether the lower court properly certified its 
summary judgment order for appeal. 
VI. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
[N]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person 
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
All political power is inherent in the 
people and all free governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government 
as the public welfare may require. 
Utah Const, art. I § 2. 
All courts shall be open, and every person 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
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prosecuting or defending before any trial 
in this State, by himself or counsel, in 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const, art. I § 11. 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
Utah Const, art. I § 24 
The provisions of this Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Utah Const, art. I § 26. 
Sec. 7 8-12-25.5 Injury due to defective design or 
construction of improvement to real property - within seven 
years 
1(a). An action to recover damages for any 
injury to property, real or personal 
or for any injury to the person, or 
for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and 
unsafe condition of an improvement to 
real property, or any action for 
damages sustained on account of the 
injury, may not be brought against any 
person performing or furnishing the 
d e s i g n , planning, surveying, 
supervising the construction of, or 
constructing the improvement to real 
property more than seven years after 
the completion of construction. 
(b). * * * 
2. The time limitation imposed by this 
section does not apply to any person 
in actual possession and control as 
owner, tenant or otherwise of the 
improvement at the time the defective 
and unsafe condition of the 
3 
improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which an 
action is brought. 
This section does not extend or limit 
the period otherwise prescribed by 
state law for the bringing of any 
action. 
As used in this section: 
(a) Person means an individual 
corporation, partnership or other 
legal entity. 
(b) "Completion of construction" 
means the date of issuance of the 
certificate of substantial 
completion by the owner, 
architect, engineer or other 
agent or the date of the owner's 
use or possession of the 
improvement on real property. 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendants Martin Stern, Jr.; AIA 
Architects and Associates; Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc.; Higham 
Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc.; and Okland Construction. 
The defendants negligently designed and constructed a swimming 
pool and sauna. Eight years later, plaintiff was injured 
while using the sauna and the pool. 
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The lower court granted the summary judgment solely 
because the accident occurred after the seven year period 
allowed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 expired. 
The order granting summary judgment was entered on 
August 4, 1988. On the same day, the lower court, pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, certified its 
order for appeal. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant, James Sanchez (Sanchez) commenced his 
action against Little America Hotel Corp. (Little America) 
seeking compensation for extensive neck and back injuries 
suffered when he used the Little America sauna and dove into 
the Little America swimming pool. (R. 2-18; Deposition of 
James Sanchez, 11/21/87 pp, 34-48.) The accident happened on 
July 4, 1986. Plaintiff, a guest at the Little America Hotel, 
filed suit against Little America on January 14, 1987 (R. 2-
18). Through discovery, plaintiff learned the identity of the 
following parties: 
1. The general contractor - Okland Construction; 
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2. The swimming pool subcontractor - Rocky Mountain 
Pools, Inc; 
3. The mechanical contractor responsible for the sauna 
and pool - Higham Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc; 
4. The pool architect - Martin Stern, Jr., and AIA 
Little America Hotel Corporation Answers to 
Interrogatories, copy attached as Exhibit A. 
Architects and Associates, a California corporation. 
The amended complaint naming these defendants was filed on or 
about November 16, 1987. (R. 51-82, 89-90.) 
The Little America pool and sauna were substantially 
completed and inspected by Salt Lake City by the end of 1978. 
More than seven years passed between the substantial completion 
of the pool and the plaintiff's accident. (R. 224-225.) 
The general contractor, pool and mechanical 
subcontractors and architect all moved the trial court for 
summary judgment, stating that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, a 
statute of repose, bars plaintiff's claims. (R. 199-201, 219-
221, 232-234, 248-250.) 
At the summary judgment hearing, Sanchez argued: 
1. the statute of repose violates the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution; 
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2. the statute of repose violates equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the Utah and Federal 
Constitution; 
3. the statute does not apply to a mechanical 
contractor who provides a defective product 
instead of constructing a defective improvement; 
and 
4. there is not a sufficient factual record to 
determine whether the statute of repose was 
tolled as to Martin Stern Architects Associates, 
a California corporation, because the 
corporation was absent from the State after it 
ceased doing business with Little America. 
(R. 257-270; Transcript of Proceedings 7/18/88 pp. 6-15.) 
The lower court granted defendants' motions for 
summary judgment solely because the seven year period allowed 
by the statute of repose lapsed, prior to Sanchez's accident. 
That left Little America Hotel Corp. as the only remaining 
defendant. Over the objection of the appellant, the court, as 
an after thought at the hearing, certified its order for 
appeal. (R. 366-367; Tr. 5-18.) 
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IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court granted summary judgment against 
Sanchez solely because the diving accident occurred after the 
seven year period allowed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 a 
statute of repose. 
The statute has no purpose other than to immunize 
architects and contractors from their torts. 
The statute violates the open court provision of 
Article I Section 24 of the Utah Constitution because: 
1. The legislature, in taking away the injured 
person's right to sue, did not provide a 
substitute remedy. 
2. Their is no clear economic or social evil 
eliminated by the statute. 
3. Even if there is some mystical evil to be 
eliminated, the statute is arbitrary and 
unreasonable. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1980). 
Further, the statute fails even a minimum level of 
equal protection scrutiny. The statute, by singling out 
contractors and architects for immunization while ignoring 
suppliers, materialmen and owners creates unreasonable 
8 
classifications. Further, the classifications do not bear a 
reasonable relationship to the achievement of a legitimate 
legislative purpose. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake 
City, 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). There is no legitimate 
legislative purpose. The statute's only purpose is to immunize 
architects and contractors from tort liability. 
In addition, there is a factual issue as to whether 
the statute of repose applies to Higham-Hilton, the mechanical 
contractor. Higham-Hilton may be liable to Sanchez for 
supplying a defective product rather than creating a defective 
real property improvement. 
Further, there is a factual question as to whether 
the statute of repose is tolled against the out-of-state 
architect. The record does not establish whether the architect 
was absent from the state after it ceased doing business with 
Little America. 
Finally, the case should not have been certified for 
appeal. The issues on appeal and the issues remaining for 
trial are interrelated. The lower court's piecemeal approach 
to appeals and litigation should be discouraged. 
For these reasons, the summary judgment of the lower 




A. THE STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
1. Factual Background 
The Little America pool complex was completed toward 
the end of 1978. 
Eight and one-half years later, Sanchez broke his 
neck when he dove into the Little America Hotel swimming pool. 
While a guest at the hotel, Sanchez had become lightheaded 
using the sauna. He dove into the pool to cool off. (Sanchez 
deposition p. 35.) 
Within seven months of the accident Sanchez sued the 
hotel. Through discovery Sanchez learned the identities of 
(1) the general contractor, (2) the pool and sauna 
subcontractors, and (3) the architect. Sanchez then filed an 
amended complaint against the contractors and architect 
alleging negligence, strict liability and breach of express and 
implied warranty. 
Sanchez's basic claim is that there were no timers or 
warning signs in the sauna, and no warning signs near the pool. 
Sanchez also alleged that there was inadequate pool 
illumination and depth markings, all of which caused Sanchez's 
extensive injuries. (R. 2-18.) 
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The trial court granted the general contractor's, 
subcontractor's and architect's motions for summary judgment. 
The sole basis of the ruling was that the seven year time 
period allowed by the statute of repose expired prior to 
Sanchez's claim. 
2. The Standard of Review. 
Because this appeal presents only questions of law, 
the Utah Supreme court reviews the trial court's rulings for 
correctness and accords them no particular deference. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988), 
For purposes of the record, it must be assumed that both the 
contractor and the architect were negligent in designing and 
constructing the pool and sauna. see, Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 
568, 71 (1973). 
3. The Standard of Repose. 
The applicable statute of repose reads: 
Sec. 78-12-25.5 Injury due to defective design or construction 
of improvements or real property - within seven years; 
(l)(a) An action to recover damages for 
any injury to property, real or 
personal, or for any injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or 
wrongful death, arising out of the 
defective and unsafe condition of an 
11 
improvement to real property, or any 
action for damages sustained on 
account of such injury, may not be 
brought against any person performing 
or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or 
construction of such improvement to 
real property more than seven years 
after the completion of construction• 
* * * 
(2) The limitation imposed by this 
provision shall not apply to any 
person in actual possession and 
control as owner, tenant or otherwise, 
of the improvement at the time of 
defective and unsafe condition of such 
improvement constitutes the proximate 
cause of the injury for which it is 
proposed to bring an action, 
• * * 
(4) As used in this section, 
(1) " P e r s o n " s h a l l mean an 
i n d i v i d u a l , c o r p o r a t i o n , 
pa r t ne r sh ip , or any other l ega l 
e n t i t y . 
(2) Completion of cons t ruc t ion for 
the purposes of t h i s act s h a l l 
mean the date of issuance of a 
c e r t i f i c a t e of s u b s t a n t i a l 
c o m p l e t i o n by t h e o w n e r , 
a r c h i t e c t , e n g i n e e r or o ther 
a g e n t s , or t he da t e of the 
owner's use or possession of the 
improvement on r e a l proper ty . 
The s t a t u t e appl ies to a l l ac t ions seeking damages 
for in jury to r ea l or personal proper ty , bodily injury or 
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wrongful death. Hooper Water Improvement District v. Reeve, 
642 P.2d 745 (Utah 1982) . 
The statute of repose is sweeping and absolute once 
the seven year statutory period lapses. The statute prevents 
the injured, the owner and all others from suing the designer, 
planner, or contractor. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223, 224 
(Utah 1974). It grants a special immunity from future 
liability to the contractors and architects. Hooper, at 747; 
see, Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980). 
Since the statute begins to run from a date unrelated to the 
injury, it is not designed to allow a reasonable time for 
filing of an action once a person is injured. see, Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). 
The lower court ruled that the statute bars 
plaintiff's lawsuit even though the cause of action did not 
arise until after it was barred. The statute cuts off 
Sanchez's action even though it was filed within the applicable 
four year statute of limitations. 
The statute is not designed to abolish minimal 
claims. On the contrary, "Its obvious intent was to protect 
persons performing or furnishing the design, planning, 
supervision of construction or construction of improvements 
from indefinite future liability." Hooper, supra at 747. 
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This immunity is not related to culpability. It 
applies regardless of whether the conduct is intentional- It 
applies whether there is negligence or strict liability. 
Further, neither the apparent danger of the construction nor 
the expected useful life of the construction affects the 
immunity conferred. The immunity protects the contractor, 
planner or designer whether the building has a useful life of 
ten or one hundred years. Contractors and architects are 
protected even if the defect is not detectable by the owner or 
user so the injured is wholly unable to protect himself. c.f. 
Berry at 673. 
4. Historical Context of Contractor Liability Law 
The liability of contractors, architects, and 
engineers engaged in the construction of buildings follows the 
general path of product liability law but lags behind product 
liability law by some twenty years. W.L. Prosser and W.P. 
Keeton, The Law of Torts, §104A at 722 (5 ed. 1984). 
Originally, the courts held that a contractor, 
architect or engineer could not be liable once the structure 
was completed and accepted by the owner. Id. As in the case of 
products liability law, the change in the law began with a 
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series of exceptions. These exceptions permitted lawsuits 
directly against the contractor or architect where: 
1. The contractor knew it was dangerous and 
defective; or 
2. The individual plaintiff's use was intended or 
anticipated; or 
3. The construction was imminently dangerous; or 
4. The construction was a nuisance infringing on 
the rights of land owners or the public. 
Prosser, at 723. 
As in the case of products liability law, the 
exceptions swallowed up the rule until the analogy of McPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co. was presently and finally accepted. Prosser, 
at 723. The contractor is now liable to all those who may 
foreseeably be injured by the structure, not only when he fails 
to disclose known dangerous conditions, but also when the work 
is negligently done. This applies not only to contractors 
doing original work, but also to those who make repairs or 
install parts, architects and engineers. There is liability 
for negligent design as well as for negligent construction. 
Prosser, at 723. 
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5. Utah Const. Article I Section 11 - Utah's Open Courts 
Provision 
Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is part 
of the declaration of rights contained in our State's 
constitution. It declares that an individual shall have a 
right to a remedy by due course of law, for injury to person, 
property or reputation. Its purpose is directly contrary to 
that of the statute of repose. 
Utah Const, art. I § 11 reads: 
All courts shall be open, and every person 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay. . . . 
Thirty-seven states have similar constitutional 
provisions. The concept of the open courts provision 
originated with the Magna Carta. Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 674 (Utah 1985). 
Utah's constitutional guarantee of access to the 
court is not an empty gesture. Rather it: 
[I]s solid core upon which all our state 
laws must be premised. Clearly and unequi-
vocally our constitution directs that the 
courts of this state shall be open to the 
injured and oppressed. We are unable to 
view this constitutional mandate as a faint 
echo to be skirted or ignored. Our consti-
tution is free to provide greater protec-
tion for our citizens than are required 
under the federal constitution. . .Our 
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constitution has spoken and it is our duty 
to listen. 
Berry, at p. 676-677 quoting Daugaard v. Baltic Cooperative 
Building Supply Assoc, 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S.D. 1974]. 
Individuals are entitled to a remedy by due course of 
law for injuries to person, property or reputation. The 
purpose of Article I Section 11 is to limit the legislature's 
power to change laws when the changes are detrimental to the 
persons who are injured. The injured are generally isolated in 
society, belong to no identifiable group and rarely are able to 
rally the political process to their aid. Berry, at p. 676. 
Recently, this Court determined whether a similar 
statute of repose violates Article I Section II. In Berry, 
supra, the court, after using a two part analysis, held that a 
products liability statute of repose violates Utah's open 
courts provision. The Berry analysis dictates the same result 
in this case. The statute of repose violates Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
In Berry, this court said: 
Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides 
an injured person an effective and 
reasonable alternative by due cause of law. 
• * * 
The benefit provided by the substitute must 
be substantially equal in value or other 
benefit to the remedy abrogated. 
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although the form of the remedy may be 
different. 
Berry, at 680; see generally, Maisch v. United States Smelting 
and Refining and Mining Co,, 113 U. 101, 191 P.2d 612, 624 
(1984) . 
In the present case, the legislature did not provide 
a substitute remedy. Prior to the statute of repose, injured 
persons like Sanchez, could sue the owner, the contractors and 
the architect for injury compensation. Because of the 
statute, Sanchez can only sue the owner. 
In Berry, the court explained that if there is no 
substitute remedy provided, (and in this case there is none), 
the statute of repose may be justified only if there is a 
clear, social or economic evil to be eliminated, and 
elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. Berry, at 680. 
In Berry, the legislature's purpose, as set forth in the 
statute, was to reduce the evil of high insurance premiums. 
This Court rejected the statute's purpose. 
In this case, unlike Berry, the statute does not set 
forth any clear social or economic evil to be eliminated. It 
is apparent from the statute itself, that the sole object, 
purpose and scope of the statute is to grant designers, 
planners and contractors immunity from lawsuits for their 
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tortious conduct. Hooper, supra; see, Broome v. Truluck, 241 
S.E.2d 739 (S.C. 1978). The statute has no other purpose. 
There is no social or economic evil to be eliminated. 
Even if there is some mystical social or economic 
evil to be eliminated by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5, summary 
judgment is inappropriate because the court is required to make 
a factual finding as to whether the statute is an arbitrary and 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective. Berry, at 682. 
In Berry, this court found a product's liability 
statute of repose to be unreasonable, arbitrary and 
unconstitutional on the following facts: 
a. The statute applied to all kinds of products 
irrespective of the product's useful life; 
b. The record did not establish any significant 
increase in product's liability litigation in Utah; 
c. The statute could not reduce premiums because 
insurance companies set premiums on nationwide data; 
d. The number of claims barred would not be 
sufficient to affect insurance premiums rates. 
e. The statute would provide less incentive to 
manufacturers to make their products safe. 
Berry, at 681-83. 
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In the present case, the identical facts set forth 
above, so far as they are known, establish that this statute is 
unreasonable, arbitrary and unconstitutional. The statute 
applies to all kinds of construction irrespective of its useful 
life. The record does not establish any increase in 
construction liability litigation. There is nothing suggesting 
insurance premiums are lowered. The statute provides less 
incentive to make real property improvements safe. 
B. THE STATUTE OF REPOSE VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE 
LAWS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
1. Introduction. 
Equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by Article 
I Section 2 & 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. They read as 
follows: 
[N"|o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the priviLeges or 
immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property without 
due process of laws; nor deny to any person 
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
All political power is inherent in the 
people and all three governments are 
founded on their authority for their equal 
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protection and benefit and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government 
as the public welfare may require. 
Utah Const, art. I § 2. 
All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
Utah Const, art. I § 24. 
The fundamental principle of both state and federal 
equal protection provisions is that legislative classifications 
resulting in differing treatment for different persons must be 
based on actual differences that are reasonably related to the 
legitimate purposes of the legislation. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 
261, 266 (Utah 1986). The latitude granted the legislature in 
making the classification depends upon the subject matter of 
the statute and the statute's objective. If the statute 
infringes on sensitive constitutional rights or if the statute 
is based on a suspect classification, the legislature's power 
to classify is substantially narrowed. Bishop, at 266. 
2. The Rights Impaired by the Statute of Repose. 
The sole object, purpose and scope of the statute of 
repose is to prevent injured persons, like Sanchez, from suing 
architects and contractors for their torts once seven years 
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pass after the real estate improvement is substantially 
completed. Hooper, supra; see, Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 
739, 740 (S.C. 1978). 
As stated in part "A" of this argument, the 
appellant's right to seek compensation through the courts is a 
right protected by the state constitution. It is part of the 
"declaration of rights" set forth in the Utah Constitution. 
Berry, at 674. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bracken v. Dahle, 251 
P.16, 20 (Utah 1926), characterized the right to apply to the 
courts for redress of wrongs as a "substantial right". 
3. The Standard of Scrutiny. 
A threshold issue in this case is to determine the 
standard of equal protection scrutiny that should be applied to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 
If this court decides that Sanchez's "substantial 
right", a right protected by our constitution, is a fundamental 
right, then this court should apply a "strict scrutiny 
standard". A strict scrutiny standard requires the statute to 
advance or protect a compelling state interest in order to 
sustain the classification. e.g.) Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
216, 217 (1982). 
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If this court determines that appellant's right to 
sue is not a fundamental right, but a right that is entitled to 
more protection than economic rights, the court should choose 
to apply a more rigorous review than the traditional rational 
basis test. The test is whether the classification is 
substantially related to a legitimate governmental interest. 
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
Cases striking down statutes of limitation or 
statutes of repose after applying an intermediate level of 
review are: Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980), and 
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978). 
The minimum level of review that any classification 
statute must pass is whether the classification is a reasonable 
one and bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a 
legitimate legislative purpose. Mountain Fuel, supra at 890. 
Because the appellant's right to bring an action is 
protected by our constitution, and is a "substantial right", 
this court should apply a heightened standard of review. 
4. The Classifications Created by the Statute of Repose are 
not Reasonable, nor are they Reasonably Related to 
the Achievement of a legitimate Legislative Purpose. 
a. The classifications created by the statute of repose 
are not reasonable. 
23 
Equal protection, at a minimum, requires that the 
statutory classification be reasonable and have a reasonable 
relationship to the achievement of a legitimate legislative 
purpose. Mountain Fuel, at 889. 
It is a two part test, the first part requires that 
there be a reasonable classification. Id. The classification 
cannot be arbitrary. Broome, at 740. The classification fails 
if the benefits granted to some are denied to others. Id. 
Although Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is sweeping and 
absolute, it is not all encompassing in its application. The 
statute benefits only planners, architects and contractors. It 
does not apply to others whose negligence in the improvement of 
real property causes damage or injury to others. Materialmen, 
suppliers and manufacturers of building components are 
unprotected, so are owners. In fact, the owner is specifically 
excluded from the protection of the statute. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-25.5; Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974). 
Only architects, planners and contractors are singled 
out for preferential treatment. There is no distinction which 
justifies granting immunity to one group; the architects, 
engineers and contractors on one hand, and not granting 
immunity to owners and manufacturers. No rational basis 
appears for making the distinction. Broome, at 740. Skinner 
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v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967). Fujioka v. Kam, 514 
P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973) . 
Several courts have considered whether similar 
construction statutes of repose establish unreasonable 
classifications. The overwhelming majority conclude that the 
statute violates equal protection. Skinner v. Anderson, 231 
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967). Broome v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 
(S.C. 1978); Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973); Shibuya 
v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 P.2d 276 (Haw. 1982); Loyal 
Order of Moose Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 
1977); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454 
(Wis. 1978). 
The first and leading case to consider whether there 
is a rational basis for treating architects and contractors 
engaged in the improvement of real property differently than 
others similarly situated was Skinner v. Anderson, 231 N.E.2d 
588 (111. 1967). In Skinner, the court persuasively reasoned: 
More important is the fact that of all of 
those whose negligence in connection with 
the construction of an improvement to real 
estate resulting in damage to property or 
injury to person more than four years 
after construction is completed, the 
statute singles out the architect and the 
contractor and grants them immunity. It is 
not at all inconceivable that the owner or 
person in control of such an improvement 
might be held liable for damage or injury 
that results from a defective condition 
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for which the architect or contractor is in 
fact responsible. Not only is the owner or 
person in control given no immunity, the 
statute takes away his action for indemnity 
against the architect or contractor. 
The arbitrary quality of the statute 
clearly appears when we consider that 
architects and contractors are not the only 
persons whose negligence in the 
construction of a building or other 
improvement may cause damage to property 
or injury to persons. Skinner, at p. 591. 
Such is the present case. Sanchez, sued the 
architect, the contractor, the subcontractors and the owner. 
Ordinarily, the owner would have a claim for indemnification 
against the responsible contractor. Little America 
crossclaimed against the contractors. However, the summary 
judgment order entered by the lower court grants immunity to 
the contractors and takes away Little America's right to 
indemnity. 
A statute which grants immunity to the architect and 
the contractors who should and would be, but for the statute 
primarily responsible for the injuries, and burdens the owner 
with liability for the damages proximately caused by the 
negligence of the architect and contractors is clearly unfair, 
unreasonable and arbitrary. The classification is not founded 
upon a reasonable distinction or difference necessitated by 
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state policy. The statute violates equal protection of the 
laws. Fujioka, at p. 571. 
b. The classification does not bear a reasonable 
relationship to the achievement of a legitimate 
legislative purpose. 
The statute of repose also flunks the second part of 
the minimum equal protection test; that is, the classification 
does not bear a reasonable relationship to the achievement of a 
legitimate legislative purpose. See generally, Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988). 
The equal protection analysis for determining whether 
a classification bears a reasonable relationship to the 
achievement of a legislative purpose is essentially identical 
to the analysis used by this court in deciding open courts 
provision cases, that is whether there is "a clear social or 
economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an 
existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means 
for achieving the objective". Compare Berry, at 680-683 with 
Mountain Fuel, at 890-891. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 does not set forth its 
purpose, but it is obvious that its only purpose is to protect 
architects and contractors from future liability for their 
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torts. Hooper, supra; Shibuya v. Architects Hawaii, Ltd., 647 
P.2d 276 (Haw. 1912). The same argument contained on pages 18-
19 of this brief applies in equal protection analysis. If 
immunizing persons from their torts, standing alone, is a 
legitimate legislative purpose, all statutes of repose would be 
constitutional. Furthermore, the equal protection and open 
courts guarantees would be useless appendages to our 
constitution. That kind of analysis could result in allowing 
the legislature to abolish any or all remedies for injured 
persons. It is an analysis specifically rejected in Berry. 
see, Berry, at 676-678. 
In summary, the statute of repose creates 
unreasonable classifications and the classifications are not 
related to achieving a legitimate state purpose. For both of 
these reasons, the statute fails any minimum equal protection 
scrutiny. 
C. THERE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS TO DETERMINE 
WHETHER UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-25.5 APPLIES TO HIGHAM 
HILTON MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 applies only to 
improvements to real property. An improvement to real 
property is "a permanent addition to or a betterment of real 
property that enhances its capital value and it involves the 
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expenditure of labor or money and is designed to make the 
property more useful or valuable as distinguished from ordering 
repairs." Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 
454, 456 (Wis. 1975). 
Higham-Hilton, the mechanical subcontractor, contests 
the allegation that it constructed or installed the sauna at 
Little America. Vice President, Stanley Nakamura, in a 
deposition taken June 20, 1988 testified that Higham-Hilton 
delivered a heating unit to be plugged in: 
Q: Who installed the heating unit in the sauna? 
A: What do you mean, "Who installed it?" There's 
nothing to install. 
Q: Just plug it in and it works? 
A: Just plug it in and it works. 
(Deposition of Stanley Nakamura, 6/28/88 pp. 20.) 
In other words, Higham-Hilton may have furnished a 
defective product rather than constructing a defective 
improvement. If Higham-Hilton delivered a defective product, 
then Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 is not applicable. It is 
simply too early to tell in this litigation whether Utah Code 
Ann. §78-12-25.5 prohibits Sanchez's claim against Higham-
Hilton. 
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D. THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENT FACTUAL RECORD TO DETERMINE IF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5, BARS SANCHEZ'S CLAIMS 
AGAINST MARTIN STERN, JR., AIA ARCHITECT AND ASSOC. 
Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architect and Assoc, is a 
California corporation. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-35 provides: 
Where a cause of action accrues against a 
person when he is out of the state, the 
action may be commenced within the term 
that is limited by this chapter after his 
return to the state. If after a cause of 
action accrues he departs from the state, 
the time of his absence is not part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the 
action. 
Section 7-12-35 applies to foreign corporations. 
Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72 Utah 137, 269 
P. 147 (1928). It is simply too early to tell in this 
litigation, whether Martin Stern, ceased doing business within 
the State of Utah after it completed its work for Little 
America on the swimming pool and sauna. If it did, the time 
limitations contained in §78-12-25.5 would be tolled and 
Sanchez's complaint was timely filed against the architect. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CERTIFYING THIS CASE FOR APPEAL. 
As an apparent afterthought, the lower court, over 
the objections of the appellant, certified Sanchez's claims 
against the general contractor, the subcontractor, and the 
architect for appeal. 
30 
Mr. Kanell: Your Honor, in light of the 
fact this case will be ongoing, and 1 have 
not presented this by way of pleadings, I 
think it might be appropriate to have this 
matter certified as a final order under 54 
( b ) . 
* * * 
Judge Young: Consistent with the need and 
the statute of repose desire to resolve 
issues, it would appear appropriate this 
request of Mr. Kanell should be granted and 
that will be certified as a final order for 
the purpose of 54(b). 
(R. Tr. pp. 17-18. ) 
The lower court reasoned that because there was 
nothing remaining as to these defendants, the appeal should be 
certified for review. Unfortunately, whether there remains 
anything to do, as to certain defendants is not the criteria 
for deciding whether to certify a case for appeal. It is only 
one element of a three element test. 
Before the lower court can certify the claims for 
appeal, it must make three findings: 
(1) There must be multiple claims for relief; 
(2) The judgment appealed from must have been 
entered in an order that would be appealable 
but for the fact that other claims or parties 
remained in the action; 
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(3) There must be a finding that there is no just 
reason for delay of the appeal. 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., P.2d 765, 67 (Utah 1984). All of 
these requirements must be met before the judgment can be 
certified for appeal. Id. at 768. Rule 54(b) certifications 
"• . .should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy to 
counsel." Hayden v. McDonald, 719 F.2d 266, 68 (8th Cir. 
1983). Certification should be used only in the infrequent 
harsh case. Page v. Gulf Oil Corp., 775 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 
1985) . 
Elements (1) and (2) are present in this case, but 
element (3) is not. The appeal should have been delayed. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) is modeled after 
and is essentially identical to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure. Therefore, Utah courts often rely heavily 
upon federal court decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) to explain the operation of Utah's Rule 54(b). 
Olson v. Salt Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 65 (Utah 
1986). 
In Curtis-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 
U.S. 1 (1980), the United States Supreme Court outlined the 
factors a trial court must use in determining whether there is 
no just reason for delay. They are: 
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1. whether the certification will result in 
unnecessary appellant review; 
2. whether the adjudicated claims are separate, 
distinct and independent of any of the other 
claims to be tried; 
3. whether the adjudicated claims would be mooted 
by any future development in the case; 
4. whether the nature of the adjudicated claims is 
such that no appellate court would have to 
decide similar issues more than once, even if 
there were subsequent appeals. 
Curtis-Wright Corp., at 8, 9. The foregoing factors show that 
this case should not have been certified for appellate review. 
If Sanchez wins a substantial verdict against Little 
America, fully compensating his injuries, there is no need to 
appeal the lower court's dismissal. Sanchez's claim would be 
moot. 
On the other hand, if Sanchez loses the litigation 
against Little America, there will be two appeals doubling the 
workload of this court on inter-related issues. 
If the appellant court will be required to address 
legal or factual issues that are similar to the pending claims, 
the adjudicated claims should not be certified for appea]. 
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Morrison Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 
1981) • The test is simply whether the appellate court must 
familiarize itself with or review the same set of facts twice. 
Hayden v. McDonald, 719 F.2d, 270 (8th Cir. 1981). 
The lower court certification almost guarantees at 
least two trials and three appeals increasing the workload for 
this court and the trial court. First, the Little America 
claim will be tried. The court will try the accident. If 
Sanchez is not fully compensated, there will be an appeal of 
the Little America trial and subsequent trial against the 
contractors and architects. The trial court will again try the 
accident. If Little America wins, it will appeal its claims 
for indemnification against the contractor and architect. 
It is this piecemeal approach to appeals and 
litigation that Rule 54(b) was designed to prevent. e.g. 
Curtis-Wright Corp., supra; Page v. Gulf Oil Corp., 775 F.2d 
1331 (5th Cir. 1985) . 
XI. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25.5 bars appellant's claim 
against the contractor and architect solely because the diving 
accident occurred eight years instead of seven years after the 
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swimming pool was constructed. The statute violates 
appellant's access to the courts guaranteed by Article I 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
Because the statute also singles out architects and 
contractors for immunity from their torts while ignoring 
materialmen, suppliers and owners, the statute also creates 
unreasonable classifications. Further, the classification does 
not achieve a legitimate legislative purpose. In short, the 
statute violates equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Utah and United States Constitution. 
The summary judgment entered by the lower court 
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this HC^IA day of ry^tl} , 1989. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By j^Mi* 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




LITTLE AMERICA MOTEL, INC., 
a Utah corporation; LITTLE 
AMERICA REFINING CO., INC., 
a Utah corporation, d/b/a 
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL; MARTIN 
STERN, JR. & ASSOCIATES; 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION CO., a 
Utah corporation; ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN POOLS, INC.; a Utah 
corporation; HIGHAM-HILTON 
MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., 
a Utah corporation and JOHN 
DOES I through III, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS MARTIN 
STERN, JR. AND AIA ARCHITECT AND 
ASSOCIATES, ROCKY MOUNTAIN POOL, 
INC., HIGHAM-HILTON MECHANICAL 
CONTRACTORS, INC. AND OKLAND 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
Civil No. C87-268 
(Judge David S. Young) 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment came on for hearing 
on July 18, 1988, the Honorable David S. Young, District Court 
Judge, presiding. All named parties in the action made 
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appearances and were represented by counsel. The Court heard 
argument and found that more than seven years had elapsed from 
the time that the contruction of Little America Hotel was 
substantially complete and the date that the present action was 
filed; 
Wherefore, for good cause appearing, and pursuant to 78-12-
25.5 Utah Code Annotated, it is hereby ordered that summary 
judgment is granted in favor of Defendants Martin Stern, Jr. and 
AIA Architect & Associates, Inc., Rocky Mountain Pool, Inc., 
Higham-Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc., and Okland 
Construction Company, and pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court further expressly determines that 
there is no just reason for delay and therefore directs the 
entry of final judgment dismissing with prejudice each and every 
claim and cause of action of the Plaintiff against Defendants 
Martin Stern, Jr. and AIA Architect & Associates, Inc., Rocky 
Mountain Pool, Inc., Higham-Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 
and Okland Construction Company. 
DATED this day of August, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
District Court Judge 
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